March 2010 Archives

The Science Vote

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Recently, Michael Brooks, a journalist and author with a background in quantum physics, announced he will stand against David Tredinnick in the Bosworth constituency in the general election. This is because David Tredinnick has such famously irrational beliefs.

This has caused some controversy, as it may split the vote and so on, and Brooks is not a man local to Bosworth.

On astrology

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I appear to have found myself engaged with @angelneptustar, an astrology fan and also a Boris Johnson fan.

This came about through Marsh's post at the Mersyside Skeptics site. I read through the HuffPo article in question (I refuse to link to that rag, but you can follow through to it if you really wish) where angelneptustar comments on Boris Johnson's astrology chart and how it shows he is very talented.

Not a blog post

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This is not a blog post. It is an instruction to anyone self-identifying as a skeptic to read this.

To Columbo's Rescue

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Browsing my arxiv feeds this morning, I picked up this post - "A defense of Columbo (and of the use of Bayesian inference in forensics): A multilevel introduction to probabilistic reasoning" by G. D'Agostini.

Considering the topic, it's an enjoyable read. It's motivated by this NewScientist article from late last year. I criticised that article myself but did not touch upon the incident with Columbo. D'Agostini provides a fairly clear if mildly technical explanation of the mathematics behind the problem expressed - of the strength of the evidence against the killer Columbo caught when he picked one of thirteen (or twelve, as the NewScientist article says, but that's a minor niggle) cameras off a shelf, taking the one involved in the crime. As NewScientist says:

If only it were that simple. Killer or not, anyone would have a 1 in 12 chance of picking the same camera at random. That kind of evidence would never stand up in court.

Pascal's Wager

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I've long held that Pascal's Wager is a completely absurd argument. Most people will know what Pascal's Wager is, but it's loosely speaking the argument that you should believe in God because doing so offers the possibility of infinite reward, whereas not doing so offers no reward at all.

There are obvious flaws in it, which apparently even Pascal recognised. The primary one I think, is that the reward for believing something does not lead to a mechanism by which you can genuinely accept that belief. If you offer me a £10,000,000 to believe that pigs can fly, I will not be able to start believing that pigs can fly just to gain a benefit.

For this obvious reason, if anyone mentions the Wager in any context other than an example of dubious logic, treat anything else they say with caution.

However, Pascal's Wager is not really the object of this post. What I'm going to discuss is instead (despite the blog title) Pascal's Mugging.

On the BHA's response - part 2

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The BHA have posted the final two parts of their response to the S&TC Evidence Check. As I covered the first parts (to a greater or lesser extent, I skipped one section entirely), I thought I should continue to look at the final two.

Paradoxes - The Meta-Newcomb Paradox

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It's nearly the weekend, and I need to give my colleagues something to keep their brains working while they're away from their desk. So...

It's been a week since you encountered Newcomb's Predictor. You, being a classic two-boxer personality, opted to take both boxes, and although mildly disappointed to find you won only £10,000, you felt satisfied in your choice. One cannot always win such games.
However, as you are walking home one day you find yourself before the Predictor once more. He explains how he's had a cunning idea. This time round, he's either made a prediction and filled the boxes appropriately, or he hasn't gone to the effort and will wait till you announce your choice and then surreptitiously fill the boxes as necessary. The Predictor does these options with equal frequency.
As you contemplate this, you receive a tap on the shoulder. You turn round to find yourself faced with yet another Being, who introduces himself as the Meta-Predictor. He can not only predict your actions, but he also has a great track record of predicting the actions of the Predictor. The Meta-Predictor tells you this:
"You will either choose A and B, and the Predictor will fill the boxes after the fact, or you will opt to take only box B, and the Predictor has already made his decision and the boxes already contain the right amount of money."

Puzzled, you contemplate matters a little further...
So I've previously blogged on the Sleeping Beauty problem as well as on Newcomb's Paradox. The latter has caused some considerable discussion amongst myself and a couple of colleagues, and to my delight we don't all agree on it.

I'll probably post further on it as the discussion develops, but I stumbled across an interesting overlap between the two.

In order for Newcomb's Predictor to do the prediction, he must presumably either read some memory of previous discussion (so poor old Chaz, having been introduced to it and found himself a two-boxer is doomed to not win the £10 million!) or somehow simulate the event.

Being a fairly materialist person, I strongly suspect that a simulation of myself would be self-aware just as I am. In that case, on meeting the Predictor and being presented with two boxes, I have no idea if I am really me or a simulated me for the purposes of the Prediction.

In that case, I am rather likely Sleeping Beauty, about to have her memory wiped.

I may make a choice only to cease to be, with that choice acting causally forwards in time in order to allow the apparent violation of causality that would allow the Predictor to act as described in the problem.

In that case, although I may be a firm believer in causality and that future actions cannot affect the past, I may have good reason to believe that in this particular circumstance my actions may well effectively do that.

It's an interesting crossover, but really this little curiosity is either a sidetrack or a weakener of the core issues that make this such a puzzler.

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On the BHA's response

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Not so long ago, the Science and Technology delivered their report on homeopathy. It wasn't to homeopaths tastes. If you haven't heard of the story, I recommend Martin Robbins' piece for the Guardian.

The British Homeopathic Association has felt the need to respond. I thought I would take a look at parts of it.

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Paradoxes - Newcomb's Paradox

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It's high time I posted another paradox blog. This time, it's my favourite - Newcomb's Paradox.

Now before you click that link, first read through the description and decide what you would do in this circumstance and why:
You have been taken by what is clearly a highly advanced intelligence. It obviously has either sophisticated technology or magic, based on the circumstances in which you have found yourself talking to it. It makes an announcement.
"I mean you no harm. I just wish to play a game. In front of you are two boxes, which for your convenience I have labelled A and B. Box A contains £10,000 - an amount I believe you will find significant and tempting, but not quite life-changing.
"Box B may or may not contain £10,000,000 - an amount that quite certainly is life-changing. Whether I have placed that sum in box B is not random. I have used my vast and inestimable powers to study your mind before I brought you here, and I have made a prediction about your behaviour.
"Your two options are to take the contents of both boxes, or to take merely the contents of box B. That is you may take A plus B, or B alone.
"If I believe you will take only box B, I have placed the £10,000,000 in that box. If I believe you will take both boxes, I have left box B empty.
"I have played this game a thousand times before with other people, and I have never been wrong in my prediction.
"If I believe you will try to be awkward and make your decision using, for example, chance, then I will have left box B empty.
"Choose now whether to take just box B, or to take both."

What do you do? Think about it for a moment before reading on.

Flattery


"neat blog"
"Don't ever stop"
  - Rita

"you are totally ill informed"
"u r probably ignorant on most things"
"yr blog cant be worth reading"
  - @angelneptustar

"The really nice thing about your blog is it always stretches my brain and makes me feel I am still learning & on the up :)"
  - Alice

"More frightfully interesting stuff... Any self-respecting geek should be reading this."
  - Lenny

"I'm not always sure I totally get what you're on about, but I like reading your blogs anyway - mainly because I know it's stuff that needs to be said."
  - Hanny

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This page is an archive of entries from March 2010 listed from newest to oldest.

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About the author

Edd works somewhere between astronomy and computing and has a general interest in science, skepticism and other related topics.

Opinions expressed in this blog are my own and not those of my employer.